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	24 November 195 FILE
	TILE
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT:	Interim Report on Foreign Propaganda Analysis
Problem:	
Discussion:	ne in the field of foreign propaganda
(a) The thre	e velumes of the RAND Report.
manheer:Oaskill	memorandum of 7 January 1954 to AD/O. Requirements for Propaganda Analysis."
w endergaterative is	comments of the State Department in com the Deputy Director, OIR, to the memoranda relating thereto.
OCI Converse	tions with personnel in State, ONE,
3. The RAND Rep differently by different re	port, produced in 1951, is interpreted addres. Thus:
(a) For some analysis is a part	it is proof of the view that propaganda of political analysis, while it is admitted
USAF review(s) completed.	
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that in this as in all things those with such responsibility should always do better than they are now doing.

- (b) For some the study suggests the possibility that there is just over the horizon a whole new discipline which has not been sufficiently explored or exploited. There is, however, no presumption of knowing what specific missions would be involved in such further exploitation or exploration of propagands, one of the best and one of the few sources of information available from the Soviet Orbit.
- (c) For some there is encouragement for a view that not only is foreign propaganda content analysis a distinct discipline, separate from political, but that there ought to be one place in the Government to turn for authoritative propaganda analysis.

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RAND has permission from the Air Force to proceed, to explore:

(a) The relationship between:

- i) political and propaganda analysis.
- 2) analysis of press and radio broadcast;
- (b) The advantages or disadvantages of propaganda analysis by:
 - 1) linguists and/or analysts from original language texts or
 - 2) by analysts from translations.

This exploration will be done on a theoretical level without consideration of organizational placement of any of the functions considered.

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5. The RAND findings might be suggestive of specific missions or functions which could be taken to improve propaganda analysis. Accordingly, a final conclusion on this question might well be deferred until RAND files its report.

Conclusions:

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- 6. Quantitative and qualitative studies of foreign propaganda in both breadcasts and press are generally considered useful as contributions in defining the meaning of foreign propaganda and for estimating foreign intentions.
- 7. Fast propaganda studies conducted and published by

 FDD are useful. The caveat currently stated on the
 inside cover of such studies is desirable: "These reports are
 based on the analysis of propaganda and are
 issued without any outside coordination. Inferences or hypothetical conclusions drawn solely from propaganda content should
 be tested against other evidence before being accepted."
- 8. This investigation has failed to uncover or develop any new specific mission, function or technique in propaganda analysis (ever and above that work currently being carried out by OIR, OCI, FDD). The new RAND study may suggest such. That study, when completed, should be made available to the intelligence community for such joint consideration as it may merit.

JAMES Q. REBER
Office of the Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

OD/PCS:JQR:KM (24 November 54)

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